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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to highlight an aspect of devaluation that is generally ignored in the
literature, namely, its positive impact on domestic trade. We develop a parity bounds model
for cattle markets of Burkina Faso with two regimes of prices, autarkic and integrated,
consistent with spatial and inter-temporal arbitrage conditions. When markets are autarkic,
prices follow a random walk and when markets are integrated, prices are equal up to
transaction costs. The integrated regime is more likely when transaction costs are low. In our
model, the 1994 franc CFA devaluation reduces transaction costs relatively to cattle prices,
thereby promoting markets integration. The model is tested using a switching regression with
exogenous selection variables. The results show that the probability of market integration
significantly increased after the devaluation.
Keywords :    Market integration, inter-temporal arbitrage, cattle, franc CFA devaluation,
Burkina Faso, switching regression model, panel data.
JEL classification: O12, Q13 
Résumé
Dévaluation et intégration des marchés de bétail au Burkina-Faso.
Dans cet article nous nous intéressons à l’effet de la dévaluation du FCFA sur le commerce
intérieur de bétail au Burkina Faso. Notre analyse théorique distingue deux régimes de prix,
autarcique et intégré. Dans le régime autarcique, la condition d’arbitrage inter-temporel est
respectée et les prix du bétail suivent une marche au hasard.  Dans le régime intégré, la
condition d’arbitrage spatial est respectée et les prix sur deux marchés ne diffèrent que par le
montant des coûts de transaction. Le régime intégré est donc plus probable quand les coûts de
transaction sont faibles. Notre hypothèse est que la dévaluation des FCFA de janvier 1994 a
entraîné une diminution des coûts de transaction favorable à l’intégration des marchés de
bétail. Les données disponibles sur les prix du bétail ont une dimension spatiale (7 marchés de
bétail) et temporelle (rythme mensuel de 1991 à 1997). Le test empirique de cette hypothèse
est mené à l’aide d’un modèle à changement de régimes. Le changement de régime dépend de
variables de sélection exogènes comprenant le taux de change réel. Nos résultats montrent que
la probabilité de l’intégration des marchés a augmenté de manière significative après la
dévaluation.
Mots-Clés : Intégration des marchés, arbitrage inter-temporel, bétail, dévaluation des francs
CFA, Burkina Faso, modèle changement de régimes, panel.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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I. Introduction
Cattle’s breeding is a major activity in Burkina Faso. This activity benefits from an ancient
and well-developed domestic and regional marketing network. A cattle is a durable good that
may be inter-temporally held for asset building, consumption smoothing or precautionary
saving [Motel Combes, 1996]. A cattle has also the characteristic of being an internationally
tradable good. Thus, the devaluation of the franc CFA that occurred in January 1994 created
new opportunities for regional cattle trade towards coastal markets [ Ancey,  1998]. The
devaluation also modified the domestic relative price structure. Especially, transaction costs
were reduced relatively to cattle prices. The effects of devaluation on international trade are
now well known. In this paper, we want to focus on its impact on domestic trade i.e. on the
spatial integration of local cattle markets of Burkina Faso.
The issue of spatial integration in developing countries has been extensively addressed in
the literature [e.g. Baulch, 1997b; Fafchamps and Gavian, 1996; Ravallion, 1986]. Earlier
approaches used bivariate correlation coefficients between prices. They have been
progressively improved with the development of linear cointegration methods that deal with
the existence of common trends [Dercon, 1995]. The validity of these approaches is however
questionable since cointegration is neither necessary nor sufficient for market integration
[Alexander and Wyeth,  1994;  Barrett,  1996]. These methods ignore the central role of
transaction costs and of non-linearities implied by the spatial arbitrage condition [Baulch,
1997a]. These problems led to the elaboration of a new methodology for market integration
i.e. the parity bounds model [Sexton et al., 1991; Baulch, 1997a, 1997b]. This model relies on
different econometric tools  e.g. frontier models [ Spiller and Huang,  1986], non-linear
cointegration methods [Goodwin and Piggott, 2001] and switching regressions [Sexton et al.,
1991].CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
4
The parity bounds model provides a microeconomic framework in which trade
opportunities depend on transaction costs. In this model, the spatial arbitrage condition
determines different regimes of prices depending on whether trade occurs or not. However,
this model does not take into account inter-temporal arbitrage, which is a major weakness in
the context of storable goods. This argument is particularly relevant in the context of sahelian
countries where cattle are the main store of wealth. Thus, one originality of our approach is to
introduce price dynamics. We further argue that transaction costs depend on macroeconomic
variables. In particular, the real depreciation that followed the January 1994 franc CFA
devaluation modified arbitrage conditions on local markets of Burkina Faso, through its
impact on transaction costs, and thus created new domestic trade opportunities.
This paper implements an exogenous switching regression model. This specification relies
on two mutually exclusive regimes of prices depending on whether cattle trade occurs
(integrated regime) or not (autarkic regime). The switching between the price regimes is
determined by a set of exogenous variables that influence transaction costs. Furthermore, a
panel data structure is preferred to a time series approach for catching the global effect of
devaluation on cattle markets.
We first set our theoretical model. We then present the cattle sector in Burkina Faso and
finally the econometric analysis.
II. The theoretical model.
Local traders make an efficient use of their information network to temporally and
spatially arbitrate cattle markets. Arbitrage activities consist of selling and purchasing
operations that remove excess profits from holding cattle. Two regimes of prices, integratedCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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or autarkic, are considered. Markets are said to be autarkic when trade does not occur and
prices move independently of each other. Markets are said to be integrated when trade takes
place between them and the price spread is equal to transaction costs. For given local market
conditions, the level of transaction costs determines the price regime.
TWO REGIMES OF PRICES.
According to the spatial arbitrage condition there is no excess return from trading cattle
from a market to another. The spatial arbitrage rule is given by [Baulch, 1997b]:
ij t j t i K P P £ - , , (1)
Transaction costs Kij are the maximum price differential between two markets locations i
and j [Spiller and Huang, 1986]. Transaction costs include all market use costs: information,
monitoring and transportation costs, trade margins, formal or informal taxes, bribes, price
equivalent to trade restrictions. Moreover, transaction costs can include traders’ normal
profits as well as mark-up margins, which is consistent with imperfect competition.
The spatial arbitrage condition implies two price regimes depending on the existence of
trade between markets. Indeed, when transaction costs between two markets are greater than
the price spread, there are no opportunities for trade. Prices on each market vary
independently and markets are said to be autarkic.
ij t j t i K P P < - , ,
When transaction costs are low, trade occurs between two markets  i and  j, the price
differential is equal to the transaction costs  ij K  and markets are integrated:CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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ij t j t i K P P = - , ,  ,  ij ij K K >
The switching between the two price regimes depends on the level of transaction costs and
on local supply and demand conditions. In unchanged local market conditions, a reduction in
transaction costs promotes inter-market trade flows and thus the integrated regime of prices.
THE AUTARKIC REGIME OF PRICES.
In this case, the price differential is strictly less than transaction costs and prices are only
driven by the inter-temporal arbitrage condition. The inter-temporal arbitrage condition is
fulfilled whenever there is no excess return from holding cattle from a period to another.
Under the efficient market hypothesis, cattle keepers are willing to hold cattle as long as they
earn a constant rate of return r [Cuthbertson, 1996]:
  1 1 1 - - - ￿ = + - t t t t P r d P P E  ;  ( ) 0 1 1 = - - - t t t t P P E E ; "t (2)
Where Pt are cattle prices at date t, d are constant live cattle by-product incomes (milk,
calves, prestige, etc.) or cattle dividends. E t-1 is the expectation operator conditional on
information at t-1. Assuming rational expectations, the expectation error is non-systematic.
Equation (2) means that the expected marginal return is equal to the opportunity cost r.Pt-1
from cattle holding. The expected marginal return is the sum of the expected change in cattle
prices (capital gain) and of cattle dividends. The constant rate of return r includes alternative
assets returns, physical storage costs as well as risk and liquidity premia.
Under the hypothesis that cattle prices reflect their ‘fundamental’ values, the capital gain is
zero:CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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1 1 - - = t t t P P E  thus  t t t P P e + = -1   (3)
Equation (3) means that expected prices are equal to their present values plus unforeseen
‘news’. It follows that cattle prices are equal to the discounted present value of dividends in
all future periods
i:
r d Pt / 1 = - ; "t (4)
THE INTEGRATED REGIME OF PRICES.
In this case, the price differential is equal to transaction costs, and trade flows are
determined by the sign of the price differential. We thus have two equations depending on the
direction of trade flows:
ij t j t i K P P + = , , , the exporting market is j when Pi,t  > Pj,t (5a)
ij t i t j K P P + = , , , the importing market is j when Pi,t  < Pj,t  (5b)
Since the inter-temporal arbitrage condition applies everywhere, prices are determined
simultaneously by equations (3) and (5a)-(5b) that become (6a)-(6b):
t i ij t j t i K P P , 1 , , e + + = - , Pi,t  > Pj,t (6a)
t j ij t i t j K P P , 1 , , e + + = - , Pi,t  < Pj,t (6b)
Figure 1 depicts the autarkic (I) and the integrated (II) regimes of prices. In the former (I),
the price differential is strictly less than transaction costs between i and j. No trade occurs and
prices vary independently of each other within the band determined by transaction costs.
Prices are hence driven by the inter-temporal arbitrage condition.
In the integrated regime of prices (II), price differentials between  i and j are equal to
transaction costs. Pj,t is at its import parity bound (case IIb): trade flows go from market i toCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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market j. Symmetrically, Pj,t is at its export parity bound (case IIa): trade flows go from
market j to market i.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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Figure 1. The autarkic (I) and integrated regimes of prices (IIa)-(IIb).
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THE IMPACT OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE DEPRECIATION ON TRANSACTION
COSTS.
The devaluation is expected to increase the prices of traded goods relatively to the prices of
non-traded i.e. to induce a real depreciation of the exchange rate. As cattle are internationally
traded goods, their prices are expected to increase in the same proportion as the rate of
devaluation. Besides, the impact of the devaluation on transaction costs depends on the
relative importance of traded and non-traded goods that make up transaction costs. In sahelian
countries, labour is the main input in transaction costs since most cattle are herded throughout
the country [Fafchamp and Gavian, 1996]. As labour is a non-traded good, transaction costs
are expected to become cheaper relative to cattle prices and so, devaluation is expected to
promote inter-market trade.
When local cattle markets are initially autarkic, the real depreciation is expected to favour
markets integration. When local markets are initially integrated, the real depreciation is
expected to reduce the price spread between markets. Since the price band is narrowed, the
price fluctuations generated by idiosyncratic shocks are reduced. So, in both cases, the real
depreciation improves welfare through generating efficiency gains.
III. The cattle sector in Burkina Faso.
Livestock is a major sector of Burkina Faso: its contribution to GDP and exports is
respectively 12 % and 30 % (it is the third export after cotton and gold). Livestock is however
a traditional sector characterised by a low productivity, as a result of climatic and institutional
factors. On the one side, production conditions are extensive and highly dependent on rains.
On the other side, demographic pressure coupled with poor developed property rights
exacerbates conflicts about land access between cattle breeders and farmers.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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The marketing system is highly decentralised and operates quite independently from public
interventions. Transactions mostly occur on organised markets with numerous local traders,
who act as intermediaries between cattle herders and buyers. Local traders have an arbitrage
activity as they may guard the stock when sales and purchases are not simultaneous. They
facilitate transactions and information diffusion between and within markets [World Bank,
1982]. Local traders receive fees per head for their services, which adds to transaction costs.
Transportation costs, grazing and passage fees that have to be paid to local authorities in
addition to other unofficial charges also increase transaction costs. All these costs appear to
be proportional to the number of traded cattle and not connected with cattle prices.
• Djibo
• Pouytenga
Source : EncartaCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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The traditional flows of exchange run from the north-east towards the consumption
markets of Bobo-Dioulasso, Ouagadougou and coastal cities. Transport infrastructures are
generally poor despite public investments. Most cattle are herded within the country between
producing regions and major consumption and export markets. There are five main cattle
markets: Pouytenga, Djibo, Bobo-Dioulasso, Gorom
ii and Ouagadougou. Pouytenga and
Bobo-Dioulasso are important export markets, Djibo belongs to the main producing region,
and Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouagadougou are the major consumption markets. After the
devaluation, the Ivoirian demand (nearly 60 % of exports) for Burkinabe cattle increased
because of a substitution effect, at the expense of European imports [Chambas et al., 1999].
The exports toward other African markets, outside the Franc Zone, have also been boosted by
the franc CFA devaluation (Ghana: 34 % of exports).
In this paper, we consider one category of animals, namely, «fattened bulls» («taureaux en
bon état d’engraissement»), for which long price series are available. Cattle prices are
collected on a monthly basis (Ministère de l’agriculture et des ressources animales, various
issues) from January 1991 to December 1997
iii. Prices are expressed per unit of livestock and
deflated by the national consumer price index (IMF).
Figure 2 highlights the increase in cattle real prices after the 1994 devaluation. It also
shows transitory reversals in the price spreads between markets. A descriptive statistic
analysis reveals that the temporal and spatial price variability tends to decrease after the
devaluation (table 1 and figure 3). This phenomenon can be explained by narrower price
bands, which is the consequence of the reduction of transaction costs.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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Real cattle prices in Pouytenga 0.15 0.15
Real cattle prices in Djibo 0.10 0.07
Real cattle prices in Bobo-Dioulasso 0.08 0.07
Real cattle prices in Ouagadougou 0.09 0.06
Spatial price variation 0.15 0.10
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 with i =1 to 4. Pi,t is the price on market i at time t , and  t P  is the mean price at time t.
IV. The econometric analysis.
THE PANEL STRUCTURE.
The data cover four markets and seven years from 1991 to 1997. One of the main
differences compared to previous analyses on market integration is that the data are organised
in a panel structure with twelve bilateral markets combinations on 84 months (1008 potentialCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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observations). For our purpose, this structure is more interesting than a temporal-bilateral
structure in many ways. First, it provides more degrees of freedom. Second, it is a
parsimonious approach that enables to test for the global effect of devaluation on market
integration. Third, a panel structure is better suited to capture the variability of transaction
costs with the latter depending on the distance between markets.
The panel structure implies close cattle traders’ behaviours in each market. A within
estimator controls for market heterogeneity in the two price regimes. Moreover, dummy
variables catch the heterogeneity in transaction cost, for each pair of markets, in the integrated
regime. This estimator implies that the slopes are the same on the whole sample, which is
consistent with our theoretical model. Stability coefficient tests do not invalidate this
hypothesis (LR-tests in appendix).
The sample is divided in two sub-samples, A and B, to take trade reversals into account
[Spiller and Huang, 1986]. Sub-sample A comprises all the observations for which the price
on the market j is greater than the price on the market i. Conversely, sub-sample B comprises
all the observations for which the price on the market i is greater than the price on the market
j.
THE EFFICIENCY HYPOTHESIS TEST.
Our model relies on the spatial and temporal arbitrage hypotheses. When transaction costs
are unknown, it is not possible to test the spatial arbitrage condition. In particular, price
correlations between markets and the more recent linear cointegration tests are not
informative [Barrett, 1996]
iv.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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The efficient market hypothesis is tested with a panel data unit root test, that is, a Dickey-
Fuller test for dynamic heterogeneous panels based on the mean of individual unit root
statistics [Im, Pesaran and Shin, 1997]. The test is conducted on the whole sample since the
inter-temporal arbitrage condition always holds. The equation test is the following:
t i i t i i t i P P , 1 , , e + a + ￿ r = D -
The null hypothesis is ri = 0 and a i = 0, for all i, and is not rejected at the 1% level.
Hence, the efficient cattle market hypothesis cannot be rejected
v.
THE SWITCHING MODEL.
Our theoretical model defines two regimes of prices depending upon the level of
transaction costs and local market conditions. A reduction in transaction costs increases the
number of integrated markets  ceteris paribus. Transaction costs are unobservable, which
means that the sample separation between integrated and autarkic regimes is unknown. The
real transaction costs are assumed to be an increasing function of the real effective exchange
rate (REER)
vi with the latter being a proxy for the real wage
vii. The transaction costs are also
supposed to be an increasing function of the distance between markets as well as of the real
oil price expressed in local currency (FUEL)
viii.
The econometric tool corresponding to our model is thus an exogenous switching
regression model with unknown sample separation [ Maddala, 1983]. The selection rule
between the two regimes is given by the following conditions:
Autarkic regime if: 0 , , > w + ￿ k¢ t ij t ij Z (7)
Integrated regime if: 0 , , £ w + ￿ k¢ t ij t ij Z (8)CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
17
The exogenous transaction costs depends on Zij,t variables: the fuel price (FUELt) and the
real effective exchange rate (REERt) with positive signs. The transaction costs are also an
increasing function of the distance (Dij) between markets i and j. FUELt and REERt can play
multiplicatively with  Dij. Transaction costs are supposed to depend on an intra-annual
quadratic trend (Montht and Montht
2).
The residuals wij,t capture chocks that affect the markets. Those residuals are normally
distributed with a nil mean and a standard error equal to one [Maddala 1983]. The constant
coefficient in the selection equation is set to one, so that the other coefficients are calculated
only up to a positive scale factor [Maddala and Nelson, 1975].
The two regimes equations can be written as follows:
Autarkic regime:  t i t t i t i S P P , 1 , , m + ￿ g + ￿ f = -   (9)
Integrated regime:  t i t t j ij t i S P K P , 1 , , z + ￿ h + ￿ b + = - (10)
Where Pi,t is the real price of cattle on  market i (i = 1 to 4) at time t; Pj,t is the real price of
cattle on the market j (i „ j) at time t. According to the efficient market hypothesis tested
earlier, f is equal to one. The b coefficient is equal to one according to our theoretical model.
In equation (10) lagged prices eliminate a possible source of simultaneity bias. St is a seasonal
variable equals to 1 from may to october
ix;  mi,t and  zi,t are disturbance terms distributed
according to the bivariate normal density with zero means, standard errors sm and sz and not
identifiable covariance [Maddala, 1983; Quandt, 1988].
The integrated regime (equation 10) holds if It = 1 and does not otherwise (equation 9).
The two regimes can then be combined into the following equation:CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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) 1 ( ) ( , 1 , , t t i t t i t i I S P P - ￿ m + ￿ g + ￿ f = - + ( ) t i t t j ij t S P K I , 1 , z + ￿ h + ￿ b + ￿ - (11)


























Equations (11) and (12) are estimated by a maximum likelihood procedure
x. An increase in
FUEL, distance or REER implies higher transaction costs and then lowers the probability of
market integration given by the selection equation. Thus, we expect that these variables enter
with negative signs in the selection equation.
THE RESULTS.
The results are compiled in table 2. Two models are estimated: model 1 and model 2. In
the model 1, the selection equation includes Dij•REERt. The latter is not significant and is
removed from model 2. Both models are estimated on each sub samples A and B. Table 3
gives the probabilities of the integrated regime. Table 4 gives the marginal impact of distance
and of the real effective exchange rate on the probability of market integration. Table 5 (in
appendix) presents various likelihood-ratio (LR) coefficients stability tests that are mostly
successful at the 5% level.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.14
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Table 2. Exogenous switching regression with unknown sample separation (robust t-statistics and within estimator)
Sample Sub-sample A: Pi < Pj Sub-sample B: Pi > Pj
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Number of observations 470 470 387 387
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Distance•Fuelt -1.65·10
-06 -2.22 ** -1.17·10






Montht 0.88 2.32 ** 0.91 2.69 ** 1.34 2.08 ** 1.19 1.77 *
(Month)²t -0.08 -2.35 ** -0.08 -2.70 ** -0.12 -2.40 ** -0.11 -2.07 **




















REERt -0.05 -3.41 ** -0.06 -4.35 ** -0.08 -2.48 ** -0.07 -1.95 *

















Seasont -2.84 -2.32 ** -2.83 -2.47 ** -3.60 -1.84 * -3.36 -1.69 *
Pj.t-1 0.98 8.44 ** 0.99 9.37 ** 0.37 2.24 ** 0.38 2.24 **
Seasont -7.39 -1.29 -7.15 -1.33 -1.83 -0.43 -0.95 -0.23
Bobo-Djibo -11.46 -2.00 ** -11.50 -2.04 ** 27.07 5.56 ** 26.90 5.09 **
Bobo-Pouytenga -20.50 -1.05 -20.16 -1.17 22.73 3.48 ** 22.48 3.06 **
Dijbo-Pouytenga -11.05 -1.46 -11.37 -1.53 36.38 5.62 ** 36.35 5.33 **
Djibo-Ouagadougou -17.63 -2.66 ** -17.91 -2.76 ** 29.55 6.57 ** 28.93 6.22 **










































Ouagadougou-Bobo -4.73 -1.01 -4.79 -1.04 26.34 5.20 ** 25.54 4.51 **
Log likelihood -1642.79 -1643.21 -1474.76 -1475.11
Pseudo R² 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.21
Significance level : **5 %. * 10 %. The pseudo R² is calculated following Mac Fadden [1974. in Davidson and Mac Kinnon. 1993. p. 522]. The LR test rejects at the 10% level the hypothesis of nullity of all coefficients.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
The estimated selection equations show that, as expected, the fuel price and the real
effective exchange rate affect negatively the probability of market integration (table 2). In the
autarkic regime, the lagged price coefficient is near one as expected and tested before. In the
integrated regime, the lagged price coefficient is close to one in the first sub-sample as
predicted by the theoretical model
xi. In the second sub-sample this coefficient is low with
respect to the theoretical restriction. This result may be explained by the existence of delays in
prices adjustments. Fixed transaction costs have the expected sign: negative on sub-sample A
and positive on sub-sample B
xii.
Table 3. Probabilities of the integrated regime
Model 1 Model 2
Pi < Pj Pi > Pj Pi < Pj Pi > Pj
Overall 0.14 0.25 0.14 0.25
Before devaluation 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.06
After devaluation 0.18 0.34 0.17 0.33
Table 4. Marginal impact of distance and real effective exchange rate on the integrated regime probability.
Model 1 Model 2
Pi < Pj Pi > Pj Pi < Pj Pi > Pj
Distance -1.66 · 10
-3 ns -1.24 · 10
-3 ns
REER -7.3 · 10
-2 -5.8 · 10
-2 -5.5 · 10
-2 -7.1 · 10
-2
When examining overall probabilities (table 3), we can notice a strong increase in the
probability of market integration after the devaluation: the probability of integrated market is
at least twice greater after devaluation. Although the devaluation increased the real fuel price
expressed in local currency, the potential negative impact on the transaction costs was
overcompensated by the reduction of real labour costs. This result supports the hypothesis that
transaction costs consist mainly of labour costs. Despite the devaluation, the probability ofCERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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market integration remains low (between 17% and 34%). This result is consistent with
previous analyses on other Sahelian countries using alternative methods [Araujo Bonjean and
Azam. 1996; Fafchamps and Gavian. 1996; Ravallion. 1986] and does not contradict the usual
observation of segmented markets in developing countries.
The marginal impact of distance on the probability that markets are integrated is negative
or non-significant (table 4). This result is consistent with our assumption that distance
positively affects transaction costs, ceteris paribus. The marginal impact of the real effective
exchange on the probability of market integration is negative.
V.  Concluding remarks.
The effect of real depreciation of the franc CFA on local market integration has been
largely ignored. Our empirical analysis does not reject our main hypothesis that the real
depreciation of the franc CFA favoured local market integration in Burkina Faso. This
positive effect on welfare provides an additional support to the devaluation decision.
The usual justification for the devaluation of the franc CFA was the positive impact on the
Ivoirian economy which in turn was expected to benefit the Burkinabe economy [Chambas et
al., 1999]. Indeed, the Burkinabe real effective exchange rate had never shown obvious
overvaluation before 1994. Our theoretical model and econometric results highlighted another
positive impact of devaluation: devaluation favours local market integration through a fall in
real labour costs.
This result is due to the predominance of traditional systems of marketing within the
country. An interesting extension of this work would be to test the devaluation impact onCERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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West-African markets integration. Our results may not be obviously generalised when
markets are more distant. Indeed, means of transport can be less labour intensive and thus the
effect of devaluation on market integration less perceptible.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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VI. Appendix.
Table 5. Log-likelihood ratio stability tests
Sub-
Sample






I 14.17 6 H0 rejected
II 0.34 3 H0 not rejected
III 11.89 3 H0 rejected H0 not rejected
IV 0.81 2 H0 not rejected
V 4.52 2 H0 not rejected
VI 5.17 2 H0 not rejected
Model 1
VII 1.29 2 H0 not rejected
I 13.07 6 H0 rejected H0 not rejected
II 0.36 3 H0 not rejected
III 10.69 3 H0 rejected H0 not rejected
IV 0 2 H0 not rejected
V 3.49 2 H0 not rejected
VI 4.98 2 H0 not rejected
A
Model 2
VII 1.15 2 H0 not rejected
I 11.29 6 H0 not rejected
II 4.77 3 H0 not rejected
III 6.04 3 H0 not rejected
IV 0 2 H0 not rejected
V 0.70 2 H0 not rejected
VI 6.05 2 H0 not rejected
Model 1
VII 5.20 2 H0 not rejected
I 11.02 6 H0 not rejected
II 4.65 3 H0 not rejected
III 5.79 3 H0 not rejected
IV 1.15 2 H0 not rejected
V 0.91 2 H0 not rejected
VI 6.40 2 H0 rejected H0 not rejected
B
Model 2
VII 5.76 2 H0 not rejected
H0 Significance of the H0 hypothesis.
I The prices coefficients in both regimes for all markets are equal.
II The prices coefficients in the autarkic regime for all markets are equal.
III The prices coefficients in the integrated regime for all markets are equal.
IV The prices coefficients for the Bobo market in both regimes are not different from the others.
V The prices coefficients for the Djibo market in both regimes are not different from the others.
VI The prices coefficients for the Pouytenga market in both regimes are not different from the others.
VII The prices coefficients for the Ouagadougou market in both regimes are not different from the others.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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Notes
                                                          
i Formally, after successive substitutions we can write the contemporaneous price as
( ) n
n t t t r P E r d P -
+ - + ￿ + = 1 1 . The transversally condition implies that the last term is zero as time goes to
infinity.
ii We do not have reliable data on the Gorom market so this market is not included in our sample.
iii Excepted for Ouagadougou where data are available since January 1993. There are no other missing data in
our sample.
iv Cointegration is not a necessary condition for market integration since transaction costs can be non stationary.
Cointegration is neither a sufficient condition since, for instance, trade flows between markets are often
discontinuous. So, at break points, the correlation between prices is zero. In other words, trade discontinuity
introduces potential coefficient instability.
v The average LM statistic is 5.59 with a critical value of 6.05 at the 1% level. The average t-statistic is –2.24
with a critical value of –2.40 at the 1% level (see Im and al, 1997).
vi Our own calculation. The real effective exchange rate is calculated as the ratio between the national consumer
price index and a weighted price index of the main trade partners expressed in the same currency. An increase in
the real effective exchange rate means an appreciation of the local currency.
vii This does not imply that the labour market is unified. We simply assume that the real depreciation induced a
common downward shift in local real wages.
viii The FUEL variable is measured by the average crude price of petroleum (IMF).  We consider that the
international fuel price reflects the evolution of the effective fuel price in Burkina Faso because of the
importance of informal trade with Nigeria. This price is then expressed in CFA and deflated by the consumer
price index.
ix Data on climatic shocks are not available.  An annual dummy variable capturing severe droughts was
introduced without success.
x Estimations are run on TSP using a combination of analytic second derivatives and the Berndt, Hall, Hall and
Hausman algorithm. We use a robust standard errors matrix to control for possible heteroskedasticity [White,
1982].
xi A Wald statistic does not reject this hypothesis at the 1% level.
xii We notice that these transaction costs do not only reflect the distance between markets. They are also
influenced by many other factors such as the quality of infrastructures, the cultural differences, etc.